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Perfectionist Liberalisms and the Challenge of
Pluralism
Mats Volberg
Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
Based on StevenWall’s work, I take perfectionism in political philosophy to include
two components: the objective good and the non-neutral state. Some perfectionist
theories aim to be liberal. But given the objective good component, perfectionism
seems to be unable to accommodate the commitment to value pluralism found in
liberalism. is is what I call the challenge of pluralism. e perfectionist reply is
to claim that their objective good can also be plural and thus there is no conict.
My aim in this paper is to show that this reply does not work. I do this by looking at
three dierent ways we could conceive of perfectionist theories as plural and show
how each is unsatisfactory.
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1. Introduction
From the liberal perspective, perfectionism in political philosophy faces
what I will call the challenge of pluralism: namely that a perfectionist theory
is incompatible with the value pluralism that is one of the main features of
liberalism.ere are liberal perfectionists who think they have found a so-
lution to the challenge: make their perfectionism plural. It will be my aim in
this paper to show that such an approach will not work tomeet the challenge
of pluralism. I will do this by examining three dierent types of pluralism
that the perfectionist could subscribe to and show how each one of them is
still incompatible with the value pluralism in liberalism.
e paper will proceed as follows: in section 2, I will look at perfec-
tionism as it is found in political philosophy and pin down its two main
components. In section 3, I will take a brief look at value pluralism as it ap-
pears in liberalism as one of its main features. In section 4, I will present
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the challenge of pluralism to those kinds of perfectionisms which aim to be
both liberal and perfectionist at the same time and also look at one, probably
most popular, solution provided by perfectionists to this challenge. In sec-
tion 5, I will examine this solution and determine that it does not work, thus
the challenge of pluralism stands for the liberal perfectionist and to meet it
they would either have to give up their perfectionism or their liberalism. In
the nal section, I consider quickly two limitations of my argument.
2. Perfectionism in political philosophy
We can talk about perfectionism in ethics as a moral theory or as an account
of well-being. We can also talk about perfectionism in politics, wherein per-
fectionist liberalisms are only one type (Wall 2009, note 3). I am interested
in the latter: perfectionism in politics (and its relation to pluralism).
Having conned my interest to one type of perfectionism in politics but
acknowledging that perfectionism canmean dierent things, the rst step is
to get a good sense of what it means for a theory in political philosophy to
be perfectionist. StevenWall (2012) has presented a general characterization
of perfectionism in political theory: it means that one certain objective con-
ception of the human good is put forth and then a set of political institutions
is proposed based on that, so that politics would conform to this ideal and
facilitate its realization.1 From that description we can deduce that perfec-
tionism in politics has twomain features: the objective good component and
the rejection of state neutrality component (Wall 2009, 101–102).e objec-
tive conception of the human good can take various forms.ere are those
which are presented in terms of well-being: what is important is that people’s
lives go well, judged according to the objective good posited by the theory;
and those which are presented in terms of excellence or achievement: what
is important is that people realize certain objective values or achieve a kind
of excellence in themselves during their lives, their individual well-being is
of only secondary importance (an individual may be required to forgo per-
sonal well-being for the sake of others or some impersonal value). Given
that the latter is much broader, Wall (2009, 101; Wall 2012) thinks we should
favor that view.
is, however, needs to specied further: there are two versions of the
1 I have chosen to present Steven Wall’s conception of perfectionism as the basis of my dis-
cussion for three reasons: (1) he is the only author that I know of who has tried to present
a comprehensive and a general conception of perfectionism as such, (2) aer Rawls’ Polit-
ical Liberalism (1996), there were not many authors who stuck to their perfectionist guns,
Wall was one, and he continues to argue for this approach to liberalism (see for example
Wall 2014), and (3) he is the author of the relevant article ine Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Wall 2012).
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excellence or achievement type perfectionisms. First, a version where the
good could be related to an understanding of human nature. Wall (2012)
cites Aristotle as a historic example andomas Hurka (1993) and Philippa
Foot (2003) as contemporary examples of this kind of approach. e main
task for these kinds of theories of perfectionisms is to present and defend a
particular kind of conception of humannature, its components and the value
it would imply. In the second version, what is important is the realization
of some list of objective goods without any reference to human nature. Wall
(2012) cites Derek Part (1986) and Richard Arneson (2000) as contempo-
rary examples of this kind of approach. e main task of these other kinds
of approaches is to compile a specic list, to defend the values in this list and
explain why other values are not in it (Wall 2009, 102; Wall 2012). While this
list need not be exhaustive, the theory should include some general criteria
for determining which kind of values should have a place on that list and
which should not, i.e., what makes something objectively valuable.
Following Wall (2009, 101; 2012), the pivotal point with regard to the
objective good feature of perfectionism (whether it is human nature or list
type) is that the things considered valuable by the theory are valuable objec-
tively and not subjectively. e people who live in a perfectionist state have
no say in deciding what is valuable for them or what is valuable at all.
But the objective good component is not sucient to pick out perfec-
tionist theories, so we also need the second component: the rejection of state
neutrality. is could mean two things, rst, that the perfectionist thinks
that the state should be given the task of promoting the good provided by
the objective good component (e.g., the state makes policies with the sole
aim of increasing people’s autonomy). Or second, using the objective good
to justify state actions (e.g., the statemakes all kinds of policies with all kinds
of aims but justies all of them in terms of autonomy). But it is dicult to
imagine what the justication for the former would have to be in order to
avoid making reference to the objective good itself. Presumably the motiva-
tion for promoting the good has to come from the fact that it is believed to be
the objective good, and if so, such actions would be justied with reference
to the objective good. In other words, all of the rst type cases are subsumed
under the second type cases. is suggests that when we ask “What is the
state neutrality that the perfectionist rejects?” then it should be taken to
be: not using objective conceptions of the good to justify state action. So
in Wall’s (2009, 103) characterization, perfectionist’s rejection of state neu-
trality is all encompassing: the state need not be neutral in the aims nor the
justication of their actions.
is kind of non-neutral state action can takemany forms: mild forms of
perfectionism include subsidizing certain activities by using fundswhich are
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voluntarily collected; a stronger version of perfectionism taxes citizens and
then redistributes those resources according to the conception of the human
good by providing certain services and products; and an even stronger ver-
sions of perfectionism would not just provide additional valuable options,
but would prohibit and ban unworthy pursuits. Yet the main point here is
that unlike in anti-perfectionist states, which aim to remain neutral on the
question of good, in the perfectionist state there is no principled reason why
the state should not act upon a particular judgment about the good lifewhich
is thought to be the best regardless of whether that judgment is shared by the
society.
According toWall (2009, 104–105), with these two components—the ob-
jective good component and the rejection of state neutrality—in mind, we
are able to pick out all and only the political theories which are historically
thought of as perfectionist, and at the same time leave enough generality to
our denition that there still can be a variety of theories.2
3. Value pluralism in liberalism
Value pluralism as it is found in liberalism consists of three parts. First, the
claim that at least in some sense, values are plural, that a fairly wide array
of things must be valuable and it is rational to value any of those things.
is normative claim is oen backed up by an empirical claim that when
reasonable people, in good faith, think about what is valuable they come to
vastly dierent conclusions. Second, which I will call the claim of unsolv-
ability consists of three subparts: incompatibility, incommensurability, and
incomparability of values. Meaning that not only are many things valuable
but that one cannot value all of those things at once and there can be no car-
dinal or ordinal comparisons of those values (no strict hierarchy in relation
to some universal measure or even way to say if one is better than the other).
e upshot of this is that if some people value autonomy and others value
community, then valuing one might mean that they cannot value other, but
both must also think that they are not in a position to claim the other to
be mistaken and that it cannot be said which of the two is more valuable.
Given these three subparts value conicts cannot be “solved.”is contrasts
with value monism which claims that there is only one value, or that while
there are multiple values, they are ordered into a strict hierarchy and thus
2 Such description gives us positive perfectionism: there is a conception of the good and the
state aims to promote it. However, it has been suggested that perfectionism should take a
negative form, such “that laws and institutions should be designed so that they prevent (or
at least do not promote) objectively bad human living” (von Platz 2012, 107). But because
this negative conception of perfectionism view is still fairly new and unorthodox, I will
not consider it further and will stick to the positive formulation of perfectionism.
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any conict can be “solved.”
Given the space restrictions of the paper, I cannotmake a comprehensive
case for value pluralism in liberalism, but I can oer some reasons to think
it is an integral part of liberalism.
is might initially seem to put me in a very dicult situation—for it
seems that it requires answering an extremely demanding question “What
is liberalism?” As Judith Shklar (1989, 21) has put it: “overuse and overex-
tension have rendered [liberalism] so amorphous that it can now serve as an
all-purpose word, whether of abuse or praise.” If one were to try to pin down
exactly what liberalism is, or at least what its core components are, then that
seems to be a dicult, if not impossible, task. It is made even more dicult
by the great diversity within liberalism. Asomas Nagel (2002, 62) has put
it: “[i]t is a signicant fact about our age that most political argument in the
Western world now goes on between dierent branches of [the liberal] tra-
dition.” So even if one were to distill out the main features of liberalism, it
is very likely that not everybody who thinks of themselves as liberal would
subscribe to all of them.
However, the outlook is not all that dire, since for my purposes I do not
need all of the features or components of liberalism. I just need to show
that commitment to value pluralism is one of them. Whatever other ideas a
liberal arms, if they accept value pluralism, then the challenge of pluralism
arises for the perfectionist.
My rst attempt to show that value pluralism is a part of liberalism starts
with the liberal accepting that persons are free and equal. Once we accept
that we must end up with value pluralism since any other solution would be
to deny others’ status as free and equal: we either deny them their freedom to
choose their own values or we deny them their equality and assert out supe-
riority over themwhen it comes to choosing one’s values. It may be objected
that such an argument might only give us subjectivism and not value plural-
ism as I have dened it here. My rst reply is that in some sense it does not
matter since the challenge of pluralism could also be oered from the per-
spective of subjectivism. My second reply is to look at the liberal tradition
directly and see if we can nd explicit support for value pluralism.
Raymond Geuss (2001) has presented one such examination of the lib-
eral tradition and he found that one of the fourmain elements of liberalism is
a commitment to a principle of toleration in the sense of a lack of oppression
of dissenters. When elaborating on the idea of toleration, Geuss (2001, 73–
74) says that it started out as a strictly negative policy concerning religion:
there should be no persecution for religious reasons and people ought to be
religiously tolerant. But this idea developed so that by the end of the 18th
and the beginning of the 19th century toleration had extended to spheres
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other than just religion (Geuss 2001, 80). In essence we get the idea of plural
values as I described it earlier as well as the unsolvability claim (we have to
tolerate since we cannot “solve the conict” between dierent sides).
But crucially there is also a second main element in liberalism accord-
ing to Geuss which is relevant for the current discussion: individualism and
autonomy in the sense of individuals being the nal objects of value and
they being able to decide the things they consider valuable. Geuss (2001, 98)
elaborates that the liberal conception of individualism means, rst, that in-
dividuals are the bearers of political relevance and, second, that individuals
are the only and nal judges of value.e latter implies that when it comes to
the good of each individual then they should be the arbiter onwhat counts as
good for them. So we also get the source of value pluralism: the individuals
which I take to be the third part of value pluralism.
When we look at another comprehensive study of the core elements of
liberalism, this time from Michael Freeden (1998), then similar elements
emerge. Even though Freeden (1998, 259–260) uses a dierent label, neu-
trality, the idea is the same: there are many things that are valuable and the
individuals should be le to decide what those are. In his own words, one of
the implications of the idea of neutrality in liberalism is that “all individual
preferencesmust be considered equally valuable from a public, if not private,
viewpoint—valuable not only in their entitlement to express themselves but
to draw equal support for their realization from the public domain” (Freeden
1998, 260).
We can nd similar sentiments being expressed also by many contem-
porary authors:
Liberal societies are crucially characterized by pluralism or disagree-
ment regarding what makes a life good, or valuable, or worthwhile.
Disagreement about the nature of human ourishing is a deep and
permanent feature of free societies. (Quong 2011, 2)
By “diversity” Imean, straightforwardly, legitimate dierences among
individuals and groups over such matters as the nature of the good
life, the sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like
[. . . ] Properly understood, liberalism is about the protection of legit-
imate diversity. (Galston 2002, 21, 23)
At the same time there is a wealth of authors who should unequivocally
be labeled as liberals who at the same time subscribe to the idea of value
pluralism:
We acknowledge, rst of all, the permanent fact of pluralism: rea-
sonable people disagree not only about preferences and interests, but
widely and deeply about moral, philosophical, religious, and other
views. (Macedo 1990, 47)
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We need most of all to make use of one of the cardinal lessons of
modernity, which is that the ultimate ends of life are bound to be an
object of reasonable disagreement. (Larmore 2008, 3)
[T]he diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a
mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent
feature of the public culture of democracy. (Rawls 1996, 36)
In these quotes we have all of the same elements present: that there are
plural values, that this pluralism is not susceptible to a solution and that
(reasonable) people are at the root of this. Hopefully this is sucient to
demonstrate that whatever else we think to be part of liberal principles, then
at least value pluralism is one of them.3
4. e challenge of pluralism and the liberal perfectionist reply
If we take the liberal position and thus accept that values are plural and un-
solvable and that individuals are the nal judges of value, then that seems
to conict with the perfectionist position of there being an objective con-
ception of the human good in which individual persons have no say in.e
conict between these two positions is what I will call the challenge of plu-
ralism. Now, this particular challenge should not be confused with another
similar problem. A conict also arises in terms of the second feature of per-
fectionism if one thinks that liberalism has also another foundational part:
the requirement of justication for coercion. It would be dicult for the
non-neutral state to meet the requirement of justication if we at the same
time subscribe to value pluralism, because due to value pluralism we cannot
expect people to endorse the objective good used by the state and thus we
cannot expect them to accept the justication for coercion the state presents
them. But to reiterate the challenge of pluralism as I understand it here: ac-
cording to value pluralism, as it is found in liberalism, individuals are the
nal judges of value, but the objective nature of the conception of the good
in perfectionism rules out any subjective nature of value.
It is important to note here that this challenge does not aect every
perfectionist in the same way. For many perfectionists this challenge does
not carry much weight since they have no reason to accept the underlying
premise of values being plural. But for those perfectionists who also want to
be liberal this is a real worry. is is because some form of value pluralism
or at least an acknowledgment of reasonable disagreement about values has
been and still is a foundational part of liberalism.
3 It should be pointed out here that while John Gray (2000) is usually taken to be a critic
of modern liberalism, he also subscribes to the idea of value pluralism and proposes a
political arrangement actually not much dierent from the liberalism he criticizes.
120 Perfectionist Liberalisms and the Challenge of Pluralism
So it seems that the liberal perfectionist either has to give up their per-
fectionism or liberalism or come up with some sort of explanation of why
they can still accommodate the demands of perfectionism within liberalism
or vice versa. Of course, this is not some new and original problem for per-
fectionists, and there is a fairly standard reply from the perfectionists to this
challenge: they claim that the challenge is misconceived since the objective
conception of the good used in perfectionism could be plural. e general
characterization of perfectionism leaves it open whether one or more (in-
compatible) kind of lives are valuable or whether the realization of one or
more (incompatible) values contribute to the objectively good life (Raz 1988,
161; Wall 2009, 102; Wall 2012). us, according to the reply, all we have is
only an apparent challenge, since there is nothing in perfectionism as such
that necessarily conicts with value pluralism, even though particular per-
fectionist theories might face this challenge. In short, the liberal perfection-
ist can claim that the objective good component in their theory is plural and
thus compatible with liberalism.
It will be my argument in the rest of this article that this response does
not work and the idea of a plural perfectionism is unable to meet the chal-
lenge, at least in any sense that the people who present this challenge would
be willing to accept.
5. ree types of pluralism
In order to see if the perfectionist reply to the challenge of pluralism works
we have to know what the perfectionist can mean when they claim that
the objective conception of the good could be plural. In this section, I will
present three possible interpretations of pluralism—of practice, values and
conceptions—and argue that none of themwould do the job that the perfec-
tionist needs them to do to successfully answer the challenge. Each of those
pluralisms concerns a dierent area of application: in the rst there is a plu-
rality of dierent practices or forms of life that are considered to be valuable
by the perfectionist theory; in the second there is a plurality of values that
are considered important by the perfectionist theory; and in the third there
is a plurality of conceptions that are considered valuable by the perfectionist
theory. To clarify the relation between the three types of pluralism: I take
conceptions of the good to be sets of values organized in pretty much the
same way Rawls (1996, 13) thought comprehensive doctrines are organized
(although each set could only have just one member). Within each concep-
tion one can nd one ormore values that belong to that conception. When a
person tries to live their life according to any of those values or realize them
in some way they are in the area of practice.
Let us rst start with practice pluralism.is would be the kind of per-
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fectionism which claims that there is a plurality of dierent, incompatible
but equally valuable forms of life or practices that people can enact. An ex-
ample of this type of pluralist perfectionism would be Raz’s (1988, 161), who
thinks that “perfectionism is, however, compatible with moral pluralism,
which allows that there are many morally valuable forms of life, which are
incompatible with each other.” He distinguishes between weak and strong
moral pluralism, and even though he thinks that there are reasons to adopt
the strong view, he still only defends the move from autonomy to weak plu-
ralism (Raz 1988, 398). is weak moral pluralism consists in two claims:
(1) that there are dierent but incompatible forms of lives and (2) that they
each display distinct virtues, thus there are “several maximal forms of life”
(Raz 1988, 396). Most importantly though, the weak pluralism does not ex-
clude that these dierent forms of life derive from a common source. So this
approach, in general and Raz’s particular version of it, would not be very
helpful in solving the challenge. In Raz’s case the various forms of life would
not be considered worthy in their own right, but only in their relation to
autonomy. If we grant that people can live dierent and equally valuable
yet incompatible lives if their lives exemplify autonomy or if they have au-
tonomously chosen to live those lives, then that does not give us the kind of
pluralismwe are interested in, since at the top (or bottom depending on how
you conceptualize this) of this pluralism is still only one value: autonomy.
As we saw earlier, value pluralism, as found in liberalism, would allow one
to reject autonomy as a value or at least recognize other values alongside it,
but here the only plurality people get to decide is how to exercise the one
true value. So what we have here is still monism, or at least monism where
it matters for the people who bring up the challenge of pluralism. is re-
ply would generalize over all perfectionist theories which are plural in the
sense of practice: having multiple forms of life does not address the concern
the challenge raises, if those forms of life are grounded by one single value.
If, however, the grounding for the forms of life would also be plural then
there might be a chance to meet the challenge. So I will now consider those
options.
If we go into the area of dierent conceptions of the good, perfection-
ist could claim that there is a plurality of dierent conceptions of the good
which are all objectively valid (and which could then serve as the basis for
a whole range of dierent forms of lives). And that within this plurality we
would nd the tools to meet the challenge without giving up the perfec-
tionism (i.e., the objective good component). While this might be the case,
this does not help the perfectionist, for two reasons. First, the perfection-
ist by denition can only endorse one of these conceptions (see section 2).
us this plurality does nothing for the perfectionist in this matter, since al-
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though there is a plurality of dierent conceptions the perfectionist can pick
only one of them. Meaning that one of the key components of value plural-
ism is lacking: individuals cannot be the judges of value. But secondly, to
claim that there are multiple objective conceptions but only endorsing one
of them seems to create more problems than it solved for the perfectionist.
On the one hand, why prefer this particular one over others? If they all truly
are similarly objective then we either need to stipulate yet another level from
which to choose from or choose by some arbitrarymethod, neither of which
seems very appealing. Because stipulating another level would not help to
solve the issue but merely push it back, since one could then raise the chal-
lenge in terms of that new level of choice. e lack of appeal of going for
an arbitrary method should be obvious: deciding these kinds of questions
based on chance or whim would make doing philosophy rather pointless.
On the other hand, if the particular conception endorsed by the perfection-
ist is somehow better, then it is questionable whether the initial description
of plurality of objective conceptions was adequate. erefore, it would not
make sense for the perfectionist to construe pluralism in this sense regard-
less of whether they are trying to meet the challenge of pluralism or not.
So it seems that the perfectionist needs the third perspective: one in
which there is a plurality of values.is wouldmean that within their objec-
tive conception there is a plurality of dierent values which are equally valid
compared to each other. As an example, we could think of a list of funda-
mental values, as suggested by the work of Jonathan Haidt (2012, 153–154) or
some other set of values, for example, autonomy, equality, and community.
Such pluralism, if suciently plural, would seem to provide the perfection-
ist with the tools needed to meet the challenge. As we saw in section 2, this
type of pluralism would have to take one of two forms: either it will present
us with a list of specic values which are included and all other values are
excluded (making it closed) or it will present us with a general description or
criteria which then determine what values will be included and which ones
excluded (making it open-ended). Any other approach would not yield a
coherent or a workable conception, e.g., the perfectionist could not say “my
objective conception of the good is plural and its contents will include all
the values that are out there” since then it would stop being an objective
conception of the good and become a mere dictionary of values.
So let us examine each option in more detail. Would the closed plural
values perfectionism be able to meet the challenge? I think there are three
reasons for thinking that it cannot. First, as soon as we are presented with
some specic list with some values excluded from the plurality endorsed by
the conception, there is again the possibility for the challenge to be raised,
since there can be people who arm those values which were le o the list.
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e value pluralist perfectionist (and perhaps also the conception pluralist
perfectionist) could reply to this worry of inclusion that their particular ver-
sion of pluralism does not need to include those values since it only includes
the values that are actually valuable. Values (or whole conceptions) not en-
dorsed by the perfectionist are not a problem because they should not be
endorsed by anybody even outside a perfectionist approach. But this reply
seems to beg the question against the liberal position, in eect, this assumes
that the value pluralismwhich the liberal is committed to does not exist. But
if our starting point is liberal then we would not be entitled to that assump-
tion.
e second problem concerns progress. If we are presented with a spe-
cic closed list of values then could the conception still be open to new val-
ues. Considering, for example, the drag (or other cross-dressing) life as an
example of a valuable life that is a relatively new addition to value space of
the modern democratic society. Of course not all additions to our space of
values are always good, but we cannot know beforehand if this or that idea
is worthwhile pursuing and we cannot know before we consider them. But
to be able to consider them as valid options the current value system has to
allow for the possibility of those new values being added to our value space.
But if the particular objective conception of the good is dened in terms of
that particular list of values then adding new values could only come about
by essentially adopting a new conception. Such amove would imply that the
original list was not valid but what reason do we have to think that the new
list is valid? is seems to call into question the whole approach of deter-
mining a specic list of values.
e third problem concerns the third element of value pluralism. Even
if we were to overcome the two previous problems then whatever list we
end up with claims to be an objective list, thus it denies that individuals can
be judges of value. It can, as we saw with the pluralism of practice, allow
people to judge between the values oered by the list, but it leaves no room
for people to judge the overall validity of the list.
So how well would the open-ended plural values perfectionism fare in
this regard? It seems that it might be able to overcome to some of these prob-
lems. With regard to the third and partly to the rst two, the perfectionist
could dene the general description of values that are included in the fol-
lowing way: all and only those values that are armed in the society. e
list is not (nor does it aim to be) exhaustive so it serves as a useful list, it is
able to address everybody in the society, it is open to revision and the source
of revision is the judgments of the people. e problem with this of course
is that this would no longer be an objective conception, thus the perfection-
ist could not adopt it. A further issue with this route could be that once we
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have expanded the pluralism to cover all the current values then are we still
dealing with a single coherent conception?at is, could all the values that
are held by people right now be brought together into one single concep-
tion of the good?is does not seem likely: a conception of the good would
not make sense if it were nationalist and cosmopolitan at the same time, for
example.
If the open-ended list would be dened in some other way, that is, with-
out any reference to people and their choices, then rst and third problems
would still apply. Any criteria that is not based on the judgments of indi-
viduals is open to leading to a mismatch between the list and the judgments
of the individuals. At the same time any such criteria would not be sensi-
tive to the source of value pluralism in liberalism, that is, the judgments of
individuals.
So it seems that there is no interpretation of pluralism that the perfec-
tionist could adopt, while still remaining a perfectionist (in the sense of the
objective good component), to meet the challenge of pluralism presented by
the liberal.
But even if we were to solve the issues faced by the perfectionist in terms
of their objective good component then when we turn to the other compo-
nent of perfectionism, the non-neutrality of the state, we will see new issues
arising for the perfectionist. Recall that the other feature of perfectionism
was that the state justies its action in terms of the objective conception of
the good and that they also try to promote it. If that conception is monist
then that seems like a very straightforward task: there is either the one value
to promote or use as justication or there is a strict hierarchy between mul-
tiple values which gives both the aims and justication of state’s actions a
clear structure. But because value pluralism implies incompatibility of val-
ues then it will be dicult if not impossible for the state to promote those
since the promotion of one comes at the cost of another (both in terms of
actual resources dedicated to the cause and substantial content of the cause),
but because the values are also incommensurable and incomparable the state
has no non-arbitrary way of choosing between them. One could try to come
up with counterexamples to this description, for example it seems possible
for the state to support both religious and atheist groups at the same time
(by providing tax breaks for them) without undermining each other. So it
seems that the problem of promoting conicting values does not arise in the
case of all values and all actions (and one could question if two dierent val-
ues are even being promoted in the tax breaks case), this is because value
pluralism does not require that all values be incompatible with each other.
But we know that some values will be incompatible with others thus a state
which aims to promote those values will at one point face this problem.
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e incompatibility also makes providing justication very dicult, if
not impossible, since if one valuewill speak for a policywhile another speaks
against it, but since both are part of the “ocial doctrine” then the state will
be faced with a choice between inconsistency in their justications for their
actions and inaction due to lack of proper justication. Neither of which
seems like a pleasant outcome. Incommensurability and incomparability
further complicate the issue since those featureswill prevent solving the con-
ict between incompatible values in any non-arbitrary way. Similar points
could also be raised against the conception pluralism: the state cannot, in
pragmatic terms, try to exercise dierent conceptions (given that eachwould
contain a dierent set of values or values ordered dierently).
If the value pluralism would not be in a closed list form but rather open-
ended so that it could include and exclude values based on some characteris-
tic to make sure that internal consistency is preserved then the perfectionist
state still would not be able to escape pragmatic problems. Given the com-
plexity and size of modern states it takes time to implement policies and to
actually get any benets from it, but if the values the state wants to promote
are changing then that would make the state’s ability to plan and execute
their perfectionist policies much more dicult. And once again the same
point applies to the conception pluralist perfectionist.4
So it seems to me that while the perfectionist could easily hold a plural
conception of the good (in the sense of there being a plurality of equally valid
values within the conception), then there cannot be a version of the kind of
plural conception which would help the perfectionist meet the challenge. It
will either be too exclusive to meet the challenge in every instance, it will
end up containing too many dierent values to form a single coherent con-
ception, or it will be so inclusive that it will fail to be useful or a meaningful
conception of the good in the rst place. And even if they could somehow
respond to those worries then the practical problems of actually implement-
ing that plurality would still prove dicult. Which leadsme to conclude that
the perfectionist reply—that perfectionism could be plural—cannot provide
an answer to the challenge of pluralism from the liberals.
6. Final remarks
Perfectionism requires an objective conception of the good and anon-neutral
state to exercise it, liberalism requires commitment to value pluralism in the
sense of there being multiple things valuable because people get to decide
what is valuable.ere is a tension between the two, one could try to resolve
it by making the objective conception plural also. is solution, however,
4 I would like to thank Indrek Lõbus for bringing these ideas to my attention.
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does not work since the plurality would be in the wrong area or could not
include all it would need to address the challenge. And even if it could, then
the non-neutrality of the state would create pragmatic problems when exer-
cising that plural objective conception of the good.
ere are two limitations that I must admit to in this nal section. First,
while I do believe that I have demonstrated that commitment to value plu-
ralism is one of the main features of liberalism, there is a bigger issue that
I have just assumed to be true: namely that we even have any reason to be
liberals. If there are no compelling reasons to be liberals, then the challenge
of pluralism looses much of its force, since the perfectionist reply would be
to just dismiss the need for value pluralism. With that said, the challenge
would still stand for those perfectionists who actively seek to be both per-
fectionist and liberal.e second limitation is that one could take the posi-
tion that this argument is merely about labels.us if the perfectionist who
also wants to be liberal sees that they cannot meet the challenge of pluralism
then they could claim to be perfectionist and pliberals, i.e., liberals without
the commitment to pluralism. It is a separate issue of whether the liberal
doctrine works without the commitment to value pluralism. But assuming
it does, then dropping the label ‘liberal’ for the label ‘pliberal’ would be a
valid option to meet the challenge of pluralism.
Despite these two points, I think that I have still made a case for rejecting
the perfectionist reply for the challenge of pluralism.
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